Jumat, 04 Januari 2008
INDONESIAN MUSLIMS RESPONSE TO GLOBALISATION
“Moderates embrace globalization with love and hope.
Radicals face globalization with hate and bomb,”
Thomas Friedman loves globalization. He writes many books on globalization. He believes globalization is a kind of humankind destiny. He says no countries in the world can’t stop globalization just like nobody in this universe can’t resist the sun comes up every morning.
Friedman makes intriguing theory on globalization. He defines globalization as a new international system that replaced the Cold War system. It involves the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before – in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind by this new system .
The driving idea behind globalization, according to Friedman’s theory, is free market capitalism and cultural homogenization. Globalization means the spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world. Globalization also means the spread of Americanization –from Big Macs to MTV to Mickey Mouse—on a global scale.
Everyone in the world is directly or indirectly affected by globalization, but not everyone benefits from it. That is why the more globalization diffused, the more it also produces a backlash by people like Osama bin Laden who feel overwhelmed by it, homogenized by it, or unable to keep pace with its demand.
Osama bin Laden declared war on the globalization and Americanization in the late 1990s. After he organized the bombing of two American embassies in Africa, the U.S. Air Force retaliated with a cruise missile attack on his base in Afghanistan. The United States fired 75 cruise missiles, at $1 million a piece, at a person! That was the first battle in history between a superpower (America) and a super-empowered angry man (Osama). September 11 was just the second such battle
This paper will
Panji Gumilang, the leader of Indonesia Al-Zaitun Islamic Boarding School, has an eloquent answer to the question how Indonesian Muslims respond to the globalization. He says moderates embraces globalization with love and hope while radicals face it with hate and bomb.
Welcome to Al-Zaitun, one of Indonesia’s finest Islamic boarding schools. It is located in the District of Indramayu, around 4 hour-drive from Jakarta. Built on 1400 hectares of beautiful parkland and having an enrollment of 7300 students, Al-Zaytun has been known as a modern pesantren worthy of setting an example for other boarding schools in Indonesia.
“It is a center of excellence for modern and moderates Islam in Indonesia. It is neither a place for breeding terrorists nor suicide bombers,” said Panji Gumilang, the leader of Al-Zaitun.
There is an emerging stigmatization against pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in the aftermath of the Bali and JW Marriot bombings. The suicide bomber, Amsar, reportedly was an alumnus of a pesantren, the Al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Central Java, which is led by the radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.
The idea of linking pesantren to suicide bomber, according to Panji Gumilang, can ruin the image of moderate and tolerant Muslims in Indonesia. There are thousands of moderate pesantrens in the country, but only a few are radical pesantrens.
“The radicals make up only a small group. They represent a minority group, but they are very outspoken. They’ve hijacked the image of moderates Muslim Indonesia,” he added.
From outside, judging by the names or physical appearance, the moderates and the radicals’ pesantrens may look alike. But, in terms of teachings and moral values nurtured they are completely different.
“Just like night and day,” he stressed.
In a pesantren like Al-Mukmin, the school promoted a hard line interpretation of Islam. The radicals feel that Islamic religious identity is at risk and is being eroded by globalization and Americanization. They try to fortify their interpretations of religious ways of being through their selective retrieval and particular reading of Islamic doctrines and practices from a sacred past.
The differences between moderates and radicals can be seen by how both respond to the globalization challenge.
“Moderates embrace globalization with love and hope. Radicals face globalization with hate and bomb,” Panji Gumilang explained.
In moderate Al-Zaitun, the students wear the same clothes as people in London do. Some of them wear the New York Yankees cap. They watch MTV and speak English as well as Arabic. They play basketball and hockey. They log on to Internet and set up their own website. They run Al-Zaytun Magazine and practice freedom of press and expression.
On the other hand, in radical Al-Mukmin boarding school, students wear the same clothes as Osama bin Laden --their hero and idol-- does. They keep a long beard and practicing religious teachings in a rigid and exclusive way. They hate George Bush because they think America is against Islam. They believe that America, Israel and the Jews are conspiring to undermine Islam and dominate the world.
They burn American flags and shout “Bush is the King of Terrorists!”.
Moderates and radicals are, in fact, completely different, just like “night and day”.
Religion of peace
Islamic scholar Lily Zakiah Munir said that in moderate pesantrens, the teaching advocates three levels of brotherhood that need to be uplifted in pursuing peaceful coexistence of all humankind.
First, brotherhood among Muslims (ukhuwwah Islamiyah); second, brotherhood among people of the same nation (ukhuwah wathoniyah); and third, brotherhood among all human beings (ukhuwwah basyariyah) regardless of their race, ethnicity, religion and nationality.
“Islam is the religion of peace, not religion of terror,” Munir said.
Thus, she said, the radical’s type of Islam is not typical Indonesian. Islam in Indonesia has been known as tolerant, pluralistic and adaptable to local and foreign cultures. But, the bomb attacks on Bali and JW Marriot are often cited as evidence that Indonesian Muslims are becoming more radical.
The Indonesian Muslim University, IAIN, has recently conducted a research to see if the entire country is becoming more radical. Dr. Jamhari, one of the researchers, said radicalism has gained a foothold in rural areas since the downfall of President Soeharto in 1998.
Although there is no evidence to suggest that number of radical Muslim is rising, he pointed at the “growing intensity of their activities, training and media exposure”.
The economic crisis that has afflicted the country since 1997 has also produced more radicalism. “Many poverty-stricken people have taken refuge in religion,” Dr. Jamhari explained.
In the case of Indonesia, radicalism is not always based on religious motives. Poor and low-skilled people are easy to manipulate. They can easily be brainwashed to do “jihad” and ready to die or kill the infidels.
Hidup terhormat atau mati syahid (Life in honor or die as martyr) is a campaign slogan of radicals and it had attracted many followers.
Moderate pesantrens, as Munir said, should stay alert for this and enhance their teachings on pluralism to their students.
FEMALE LEADERS IN PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY
This is the paradox of Asia. Its cultures have long been typecast as patriarchal, but a presumptively sexist culture has been breeding some of the world’s most interesting female leaders –the Bhuttos, Gandhis, Soekarnoputris, Aquinos, Arroyos and Bandaranaikes.
Asia now fields more top-level female leaders more than the United States (Tom Plate, 2002). U.S. has 51 presidents already, but none of them are women. While American still awaits the apotheosis of its first female president, women rule in Asia.
Why so many women leaders in Asia, a region that has been described as an overtly patriarchal states? This short paper will try to answer the intriguing question.
Subordinate to men
In a patriarchal society, women are subordinate to men within the family and the States/Government. Women’s primary civic duties are performed in their roles as wives and mothers (Robinson, 2002). A gendered model of political authority with its origin in an imagined tradition of a patriarchal family is a cornerstone of the State ideology.
The gendered ideology –that putting the male power over women—has been institutionalized, internalized and imposed on the society in many government regulations or religious laws.
In Indonesia, for example, the conservative Muslim leaders have attempted to block the rise of women leaders, arguing that female leadership violates Islamic principles. The (gendered) cards would seem to have been heavily stacked against female leadership in Indonesia.
Yet patriarchy did not block women from heading anti-dictatorship struggles. Rather, gender stereotyping proved to be of political advantage. As women, the politicians in question were perceived to be weak making them appear less threatening to ambitious opposition rivals. They were the “mother” or “sister” of a suffering nation. They promised to cleanse the soiled public realm with private, familial virtue.
Megawati Sukarnoputri was the victim of openly gender-motivated attacks in Indonesia. After emerging as the most popular oppositionist from the Anti-Suharto movement, conservative Muslim politicians tried to undercut her presidential campaign, claiming Islam forbids the election of a female Leader:
Although her party received a plurality in the June 1999 parliamentary Polls, she lost a narrow vote for the presidency in the people’s Consultative Assembly. Her reluctance to cut political deals was one reason for her defeat. But she was clearly hampered in her efforts to win votes from a coalition of Muslim parties that united against her candidacy on the basis of gender.
Ironically, after Megawati succeeded to the presidency upon the legislature’s with a conservative Muslim leader who had earlier argued that women are not fit for high office. The new vice president, Hamzah Haz, who leads the country’s third largest party, the Muslim-based United Development party, moderated his views, saying a female president was preferable to an incompetent and corrupt man.
Viewed through traditional gender stereotypes, female leaders were not considered to be threatening to potential rivals, making it easier to unite opposition. Belonging to “weaker sex” and stressing non violence, female leaders represented what Vaclav Havel has called “the power of the powerless”. Suharto ungentlemanly attacks on Megawati made him heartless. Megawati leader received not only enthusiastic support in their own countries, but were also celebrated by the foreign press, despite their lack of policy specifics. Women could lead victorious democratic revolutions because thy occupied the moral high ground.
Less than two years after hard-line Islamic politicians blocked her from the presidency, claiming a woman could never govern the world’s most populous Muslim nation, Megawati Soekarnoputri has finally become Indonesia’s first female head of state on July 23, 2001.
Another reason for the rise of women leaders is that traditional stereotypes about their gender were not a hindrance, but proved to be to their political advantage. In the feminist literature the rarity of female leadership is commonly explained by the cultural construction of the role of women which is traditionally based in the family. But such a patriarchal ideology did not hinder women from achieving leading political positions in these Asian countries. Women leaders were often perceived as political. They were best suited to lead a moral struggle against male machiavellis. As the wives, widows, or daughters of male martyrs, these women rose to political power “over his dead body,” in Diane Kincaid’s ironic phrase. Murdered, imprisoned, or discredited Asian male politicians became political martyrs (al least for their supporters); their often-ambivalent political backgrounds were conveniently overlooked as “their” cause was taken up by their female successors. At the same time the experience and abilities of these women was left unquestioned (once in power, however, the competence of women leaders often became a question of great political importance, the answer to which was often given by men).
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN PATRIOTIC JOURNALISM
Journalism ethics and principles will get serious challenges when your own country goes to war, said Kate Edie of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). It is true here in Aceh, a war-torn province of Indonesia.
At war, journalists everywhere, not only in Indonesia, will face problems on loyalties, nationalism, and patriotism.
If your own country in a serious threat of survival, at the edge of disintegration, or at the risk of Balkanization, then the principles of journalism and ethics such as truth, objectivity, and balance will be questioned by the military, the states, and the citizen.
Journalists in Aceh with their safety on risk and report the truth from the battleground will be criticized for not “patriotic enough” because they cover the stories both sides. The Indonesian government wants journalists to be on their side and not “sleeping with the enemies of the state”.
The Indonesian military (TNI), fore example, criticized media reports of the rebellion in Aceh province (GAM, Free Aceh Movement), saying that they labeled the separatist insurgents as “heroes” rather than traitors.
Military chief General Endriartono Sutarto urged the press to be fair in their coverage of the war-torn region.
“What is strange for me…is that rebels are labeled by the media as heroes. How could that happen?” he told reporters.
He said the media ran reports on the rebels “without a single sentence describing them as a group of Indonesians committing treason against the nation”.
However, he said, he wasn’t in favor of censorship. But, he wanted journalists as part of Indonesian citizen to be patriotic and do patriotic journalism. It means journalists asked to be on the side of the government and not to give voice to the rebels.
Since 1976, GAM rebels have been fighting for independence for the oil-and-gas-rich province. At least 12,000 people have been killed in the fighting so far.
At war, the state needs a good citizen rather than a good journalist.
“Before you become a good journalist, you need to be a good citizen first,” said Major General Endang Suwarna, the Military Commander of the Martial Law Administration in Aceh province.
Indonesian journalists as good citizen, he added, write the stories with the spirit of nationalism and patriotism. General Suwarna urges media for not publishing the leaders of GAM statements and invite journalists to use military facilities for their reporting in Aceh.
Learning from the success of embedded journalism in Iraq, the TNI invited journalists to cover the war in Aceh to open up the military campaign to public scrutiny. TNI encourage journalists to be embedded with the troops and discourage those who work independently, especially foreign correspondents.
The Martial Law Administration in Aceh issued on July 2003 a declaration banning foreigners from visiting the province and limiting the movements of foreign journalists to Aceh. Foreign journalists and correspondents may report only from the provincial capital Banda Aceh and the capitals of the province’s 15 regencies. Traveling between districts requires a military or police escort.
General Suwarna said that the guidelines were aimed at ensuring the safety of foreign in Aceh. But, foreign media correspondents in Indonesia criticized the declaration. They said the regulation had effectively banned foreign media access to the province. They urged the government to ensure that foreign journalists could travel freely to and within Aceh.
They believe that the guidelines for media coverage in Aceh had effectively hampering the press from obtaining balanced reports on the current military operation in Aceh. Coverage by local media is subject to restriction as well. The TNI bans statements from rebels while at the same time encourages the media to send embedded journalists reporting from the military side
Thus, ethical problems in the case of military operation in Aceh are:
1. Journalists take side to the TNI
2. Journalists tell only the half-truth (the truth belong to the TNI).
3. Journalists were not able to cover both sides (TNI bans statements from rebels).
4. Journalists could not maintain their objectivity (all fair in love an war).
5. Journalists have failed to fulfill their obligation to observe and tell readers
what is really going on in Aceh, because military restriction under Martial
Law Administration.
REFERENCES
Associated Press report on August 30, 2003.
The Jakarta Post report on 1 July 2003
T. Yulianti, Media Coverage on Military Operation, Suara Pembaruan Daily, 27 May 2003.
T. Yulianti, Patriotic Journalism, Kompas , August 2003.